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IF one were to name one outstanding characteristic of Upanishadic
philosophy, one's choice would properly fall on the identifica-
tion of knowing with being. This equation, whether in an out-
spoken or implied term, may be met with on every hand through-
out the Upanishads. Deussen. who has done the most important
work on the Upanishads, regarded the atman hralunan equation,
that is. the equation between the individual self and the universal
spirit, as the basic thought in this literature. Yet the above named
identification is more primitive, pervasive, and commoner. The
atman braJimau idea, perhaps, is but a particular case of this mode
of thought which gees back to earlier literature. In the Upanishads,
however, the coalition of knowledge and existence finds a more
rational expression and is exploited philosophically.
In the Brnhmanas and the Aranyakas already we frequently
read : ya ez'<r]n veda, "he who knows this." And not solely to in-
dicate the end of a paragraph is it repeated : 'yea. he who knows
it
!' The word is too weighty, too sincere, to be comparable to our
lightly thrown out T know." All the depth of human experience
and emotion stirred to the very bottom speaks out of it. Dear and
gratifying it must have sounded to those who had the first-hand
knowledge and could now relate it to the eager student ; quicken-
ing and fascinating to the cela in his first lessons whereby he was to
aspire to the great experience in communion with his venerable
teacher : challenging and warning to those who never were allowed
to gain possession of the liberating knowledge.
One might rightfully raise the question as to why the ancient
Hindus insisted on knowledge and in how far knowledge for them
contrasted with action. The first of these inquiries will never be
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wholly satisfied. The social and liistorical background is too scanty
to j)ermit a conc!usi\e judgment. Certain it is, that the knowledge
so fre(|uently referred to relates to the \'edic complex of knowl-
edge. Whether this complex wholly or partly owes its origin to
a deliberate attempt to set uj) a barrier between the Aryans and
the original inhabitants, or whether it has grown up independently
of such or similar considerations, must remain a matter of dis-
pute. Yet even in pre-Upanishadic literature we find this complex
in a stage of transformation, reshaping and supplementing. This
ya cvam vcda refers at times to individual experiences which are
not wholly in line with the great bulk of tradition. Moreover, the
Upanishads are known to obliterate the distinctions between caste,
age, and sex. From all that it is highly improbable that the ya
cz'ani I'cda is designed intentionally as an impediment for any other
but the intellectual class. This consideration leads, by inference, to
the conclusion at which we shall arive in a different way later, that
the knowledge referred to is not a knowledge by description but
one of ac(iuaintance and, furthermore, not of intellectual faiuiliar-
ity, erudition or learning, but of insight, exj:)eriencf', and living.
Anquetil Duperron, the first to make known the Upanishads
in Europe through his Latin rendering of the Persian translation
of some Upanishads, struck the keynote and the spirit of these
treatises aright when he prefixed to his work this motto: "Quis-
qiiis Dcum intelligit, Dciis fit." lie took it from the Upanishads
themselves which say, for instance, in Miuidaka 3.2.9. yo brahma
vcda brahma cva bharati, 'he who knows Bralinia becomes Brahma.'
However, the Latin formulation sounds religious, whereas the
L'jjanishads are ])riniarily philosophically oriented. Thus their
characteristic is, perhajxs, better formulated more broadly as
:
'Quidris scio, idem sum; whereof the Mundaka passage is but an
illustration.
The fourth Rrfdimana of the first Adhyaya of the Tlrhad-
aranyaka Upanishad teaches throughout that knowledge is self-
distinguishing being, or that being is self-distinguishing by know-
ing. The primeval dtman, or self, perceiving nothing but himself,
came to know this and hence the world-all arose. In this Brfdimana
there are at least three versions of the creation of the world, and it
is pervaded with very primitive conceptions. However, there is
nothing accidental to these treatises and the phraseology is of no
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mean importance. If a wish, a mere word, or a conscious act of
judgment is made responsible for the existence of the cosmic sphere,
it is so many different points of view which presuppose a certain
philosophic reflection.
It is again this curious relationship between knowing and the
existence of that which is known. There is, furthermore, a real
participation or sharing in the being of what is known. In the same
section of this ancient Upanishad the promise is that he who
knows the creation as having taken place in that fashion (ya cvai'n
I'cda) will be in that very creation.
The examples are too plentiful to be worth enumerating. How-
ever, mention must be made of the later much discussed correla-
tion of one's state of knowledge and one's circumstances at birth.
In Kaushitaki Upanishad 1.2 this typical doctrine of reincarna-
tion is already well developed. The passage stresses action also as
determining one's birth.
The consecjuence of knowing (znd) are various. The expec-
tations of the knower vary from terrestrial joys and possessions
to more celestial and lasting happiness and pleasure or the en-
compassing of philosophic truth.
It is to Deussen's great credit that he pointed out that the re-
lationship which obtains beween the knower of atnian and salva-
tion is one of logical implication. This is true beyond doubt and
comes to conscious expression in technical philosophical passages.
]^)Ut the great majority of the sections in question may hardly be
interpreted in this way. The explanation is much simpler and has
a primitive root.
In the first place, the correlation of knowing and being may
be due to the general affinity of I'ld and sat. The native grammarians
divide the root vid into three classes: (1) vid—jnane; (2) vid—
sattayaui : and ( 3 ) znd—labhe. That is, znd has three connotations
(philologists say there are three distinct roots), to know, to be, to
find. \Miatever theories we may have about this word, the philo-
sophical implication of the correlation between knowing and be-
ing is not irrelevant to this philological peculiarity.
In the second place, to a person even of moderate philosophic
training the bearing which knowing has on being, in short the
epistemological problem, must be jof interest, and a less cool intel-
lect is apt to pass rash judgment. To this may come, as a mo-
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nicnt of second rate importance, however, tliat tlie class whicli
had 'knowledge' was at the same time that portion of the popu-
lation which enjoyed also all earthly comforts.
In the third place, knowing, for the I'panishadic philosophers,
involves a psycho-])hysical relationship. This is the case notably
when. es])ecially in the later literature, the word for knowing in
the original text is Udt 7'/V/, hut ind. Philological discusions are
usually irrelevant to j)hil()sophical ])roblems, hut wc venture to say
that tliis minimum of philological digression is absolutely necessary
for an understanding of the Hindu conception of knowledge.
It may not solely be due to the fact that the verb jild occurs
especially in later literature that the j)hilosophic import (as wc
understand the word ) is commonly more ob\ious than in z'id.
Where the two are found together. \ id has the tendency to charac-
terize intellectual knowledge, while jnd ought never to be trans-
lated by 'to know' simply. To aid our interpretation of the Hindu
frame of mind we therefore should always take it more pregnant-
ly as 'to realize' in order to convey a little the profundity attach-
ing to the word and its derivatives. Realizing has a depth which
bare knowing does not possess. If we duly take into accout the facts
it becomes difficult to understand why some have charged the
thinkers of ancient India with intellectualism.
It may serve as a good example of the life and character of
the Upanishad sages and i)hilnso])hcrs if we investigate tirst some
of the results of knowing {7'id), and then those of realizing (jrul).
These Indian ascetics—as we are liable to picture them to ourselves
—appear in f|uite a dilYerent light. They are concerned with satis-
faction of all desires when they have attained knowledge of a cer-
tain ty])e : they hope for ofTs])ring, cattle, general prosperity, and
longevity ; and in their worldly interest they think even of keeping
off hostile relatives, shciuld one be accjuainted with a certain doc-
trine, while fame, honor, greatness, freedom from rivals, and do-
minion, as well as praise, service and worship by the ])eople are
common rewards of knowledge. The Baconian "knowledge is
power" seems weak in comparison with all these assertions.
On a more psychological level and more reasonable are the
quite numerous descriptions of the knower as shining and glow-
ing with lustre, glory, splendour, beauty, and so on. I le is also
said to get a firm basis and support, and win the worlds, which again
THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UPANISHADS 575
is equivalent to becoming immortal or imperishable, to leaving the
body behind, overcoming repeated death, reaching the heavenly-
world, or however else the phrase may run.
Under the head of philosophic knowledge which constitutes
liberation in itself will go all those cases in which the knower is be-
lieved to become one with the highest reality, be it Ciinian, braJunan,
purusa, \'ishnu, Krishna, etc. Expressed references to liberation
as caused by knowledge are ever recurring: being saved, being
born no more, attaining unity, non-duality, identity, bliss, and
peace. Knowing a L^panishad would indicate not an intellectual
acquaintance with its contents, but realization in the fullest measure.
Knowledge of the type of realizing (jnd) is used preferably in
a context that deals with very vital problems. In a large number of
cases it is a matter of liberation, perfection, peace, and immortality
—all problems most essential to the Hindu mind, ft is hardly prob-
able and possible even that a mere knowing, a bare intellectual re-
lationship, should ever have been considered as the only require-
ment for moral goodness and everlasting satisfaction.
The consequences of 7/7(7 are in many ways similar to those of
of vid. A person having the experience of realization believes him-
self to have gone to non-death, having reached amrtyu (immor-
tality) already, or at least to have conquered or cut the cord of
death, as the expression is. It 'frees from all fetters', liberates,
and is instrumental in attaining the three worlds or reaching brah-
man. Peace, happiness, and bliss also are a reward, and likewise
individual perfection, release from all misfortune, dispelling all
dilusion (uioJia), as well as obtaining or losing all desires (the two
being synonymous for Hindu thought, according to the saying
"nihil habentcs omnia possidcntcs").
In more philosophic passages we have a realizing of or grasp-
ing in its full meaning and significance a thing of worth, a fun-
damental truth, or a character of reality as such. Elsewhere the
verb may be taken to mean recognizing or acknowledging or gaining
a deep and vital insight. This insight must be, or cannot otherwise
but be imparted by a teacher by word of mouth.
Oldenberg is essentially right when he says that in the Upani-
shads one is not concerned with knowledge of the order of cool and
supercilious apprehension, nor with a knowledge of clear-cut, objec-
tive conceptions. Not for the reason that they did not know the art
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of definition ; Init because they were frank, sincere, and personal in
their attitude.
The fervor with wliicli the liinchi considers the acquisition of
rif,dit knowledge from a (jin'u, a teacher, may well be regarded as
a religious jiredilection. If so, however, that which is so characteris-
tically Hindu is lost. Religion is too vague a conce])t to be ai)])lica-
ble to the L'panishads in their entirety.
Into this category of interjjretation falls also the contention that
Hindu thinking especially with reference to the knowledge prob-
lem is essentially magical. It is, in as far as knowledge of whatever
kind is reputed to bluntly cause changes in the objective universe.
However, leaving alone this unphilosophic and naive view which,
to some extent, is current even now, the Hindu definition of philo-
sophy has always distinguished itself from our Western definitions
in that it meant, and still means to the Hindus (and. as a matter of
fact, to the whole ( )rient ) a LchensmichanuHij. In other words,
they believe, as many advocates of a philosophy of life even now
do, that my philosoi)hic \)o\\\i of view colors my relation and at-
titude towards the universe. Call this magic, if you like, but you
might in labelling it thus do injustice to those early thinkers to
whom the greatest respect is due for their formulating for the
first time in history the greatest and sublimest of all truths, tat tvam
asi.
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